The Quebec Ombudsman Responds to Justice-Quebec.ca

The reply confirms a central point of our investigation: follow-up on recommendations exists, but it is confidential. The institution writes explicitly that "all our follow-ups are documented in our intervention files, which are confidential." For the citizen or journalist who wishes to verify whether an accepted recommendation has actually been implemented by a ministry, no public register can be consulted.

The reply also confirms that no sanction mechanism exists in cases of inertia by a body. Where no satisfactory measure is taken "within a reasonable time," the Ombudsman may, in order: notify the government in writing, mention the case in its annual report, or report it in a special report. None of these steps is binding on the body concerned. The leverage remains, in every case, media and political pressure.

Finally, the follow-up on recommendations in the annual report is a chronological follow-up, not a public dashboard tracking the actual state of implementation: each report presents new recommendations and certain reminders, but no public document consolidates, in a single overview, all the recommendations accepted in recent years together with their actual implementation status.

This reply deserves particular attention because it directly contests a significant finding of our original article — a finding we had supported with the investigation published by Le Devoir in November 2025. The Ombudsman states that the "flagship recommendation" of the 2011 report — the transfer to the Ministry of Health and Social Services of responsibility for care in correctional facilities — is now implemented.

On this point, there is therefore a substantive disagreement between two sources: on one side, Le Devoir's investigation of November 2025 documenting that the main recommendations of the 2011 report — and those of the Coroner's Office — have still not been implemented; on the other, the Quebec Ombudsman's official position stating that the flagship recommendation is implemented. This disagreement cannot be settled by our analysis alone. We invite readers to consult both the 2011 report and Le Devoir's investigation to form their own opinion. The figure of 74 suicides in provincial correctional facilities between 2014 and 2024, however, is not contested.

The reply also confirms a key point of our investigation: for systemic recommendations, the Ombudsman explicitly acknowledges that they may take "several months or even years to materialize," and that its only recourse in case of blockage is to "issue reminders" in the annual report or "inform parliamentarians." No capacity to enforce implementation. This is exactly what the original article documented.

The announcement of an upcoming investigation into complex mental health cases is a development worth following. We will return to it upon publication.

The reply to this question provides important clarification on the legal framework governing the confidentiality of the Ombudsman's investigations. The institution rightly points out that this confidentiality is not a discretionary internal policy but a statutory requirement under the law that governs it. On this level, the legal rigour of the reply is undeniable.

The question, however, addressed another dimension: does the Ombudsman, as an institution, wish to see this framework evolve? On that specific point, the reply cites the legal provisions without taking a position on their desirability. This leaves open the question of whether the institution views confidentiality as a useful feature of its action or as a constraint it would like to see reformed. The Ligue des droits et libertés and Alter Justice have publicly denounced this opacity as an obstacle to citizen oversight. The Quebec Ombudsman, which has an explicit power to propose legislative changes under section 27.3 of its enabling Act, signals no initiative in that direction. Without a clearer institutional position, the status quo remains.

One important detail: section 27.4 cited by the Ombudsman states that it may publicly comment on an intervention "where it deems it of public interest to do so." A power of transparency does therefore exist, partially, in the law. It depends on the institution's discretionary assessment. The question remains open: on what criteria does this assessment rest, and could it lead to more regular transparent disclosures?

This is, without any contestation, the strongest and most important reply the Quebec Ombudsman provides to our investigation. It deserves clear editorial credit. The situation described by the 2021-2022 data (two visits for seventeen prisons, Hull facility not visited for six years) no longer reflects the reality of 2024-2025.

The figures provided by the institution for the past three years are as follows:

The figure of 14 inspection visits in 2024-2025 brings the institution back to the activity level of 2015-2016 (14 visits). This is, factually, a return to the highest standards observed in the last decade. The twelve facilities visited by name (Amos, Laval, Montreal, New Carlisle, Percé, Quebec City, Rimouski, Rivière-des-Prairies, Saint-Jérôme, Sherbrooke, Sorel and Trois-Rivières) cover a large part of the provincial correctional network.

On this specific point, the finding set out in our original article — although factually accurate at the time Pivot.quebec published its investigation — calls for an update. The Ombudsman's presence in correctional facilities has clearly increased. The COVID argument for 2021-2022 is also valid: virtually all independent inspections in Quebec were suspended during this period.

However, two points are not resolved by this reply. First, the question also concerned the "minimum one-visit-every-four-years per facility" plan presented in the Ombudsman's 2023 report — the institution does not address this directly. Second, the content of the visit reports remains confidential: we now know that visits take place, but the public and the media still do not have access to the findings drawn from them.

This reply provides a major data point for understanding the institution's operations, and we thank the Office of the Ombudsman for sharing it with such clarity.

First factual element: 12,242 grounds received in 2024-2025 concerned bodies outside the Ombudsman's jurisdiction. Of the 28,210 grounds processed in total that year, this represents nearly 43 % of total volume. In other words: nearly one citizen out of two who contacts the Ombudsman is directed to another resource without an analysis on the merits being conducted by the institution.

Second element: the institution states honestly that "we cannot follow up on redirected requests." This rests on an understandable structural logic — the Ombudsman, having no jurisdiction over the bodies to which it directs citizens, cannot legally or technically ensure such follow-up. But this raises an important public-interest question: for these 12,242 files — for the year 2024-2025 alone — no independent authority knows what becomes of citizens once redirected, nor whether their request reaches a satisfactory outcome with the recommended resource.

This is the "redirection counter" mechanism described by our original article. The Ombudsman's transparency on this data is to be commended: this specific volume did not appear in any official communiqué and was not, to our knowledge, publicly known. This information makes a more informed public debate possible on the architecture of accountability in Quebec.

This is the most politically loaded reply of all. It does not say yes, it does not say no — but it states an institutional positioning that, in practice, amounts to a categorical refusal of any reform. Three points are worth highlighting.

First, the institution explicitly refuses binding power. The phrase is clear: "Coercive power would move us away from the role of an ombudsman." The Quebec Ombudsman therefore does not merely note that the law does not grant it such power — it states that it does not want it. This is a deliberate position. This settles, at the institutional level, the question raised for years by the Ligue des droits et libertés and several jurists: binding power will not be requested by the institution itself.

Second, the institution rules out any expansion of the mandate. The question included extending the mandate to municipal police forces and professional orders. The reply does not even address these points. The silence amounts to maintaining the status quo.

Third, and perhaps most striking, the Ombudsman itself cites a judgment that confirms the finding of our original article. The judgment Rouleau v. Placements Etteloc Inc., rendered in 2000, establishes that the Ombudsman "is not a sort of investigative arm of the courts" and that it "is not made available to litigants." Yet that was precisely the central point of our investigation: for the majority of injustices a Quebecer suffers at the hands of the State or its institutions, the Ombudsman is not an effective recourse. The Ombudsman does not contest this. It confirms it, by citing case law.

Our article concluded that the Quebec Ombudsman "is not a protector in the sense the word suggests." The institution's reply, by citing a judgment that establishes that it is not the investigative arm of litigants and that binding power would move it away from its role, supports this finding — it does not refute it.